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More than half of U.S. currency circulates abroad. As a result, much of the seignorage income of the
United States is generated outside of its borders. In this paper we characterize the Ramsey-optimal
rate of inflation in an economy with a foreign demand for its currency. In the absence of such demand,
the model implies that the Friedman rule—deflation at the real rate of interest—maximizes the utility
of the representative domestic consumer. We show analytically that once a foreign demand for domestic
currency is taken into account, the Friedman rule ceases to be Ramsey optimal. Calibrated versions
of the model that match the range of empirical estimates of the size of foreign demand for U.S. currency
deliver Ramsey optimal rates of inflation between 2 and 10 percent per annum. The domestically benevolent
government finds it optimal to impose an inflation tax as a way to extract resources from the rest of
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More than half of U.S. currency circulates abroad. Porter and Judson (1996), for instance,
estimate that at the end of 1995 $200 to $250 billion of the $375 billion of U.S. currency
in circulation outside of banks was held abroad. The foreign demand for U.S. currency
has remained strong across time. The 2006 Treasury, Federal Reserve, and Secret Service
report on the use of U.S. currency abroad, issued a decade after the publication of Porter
and Judson, estimates that as of December 2005 about $450 billion of the $760 billion of
circulated U.S. banknotes are held in other countries.
The estimated size of the foreign demand for U.S. currency suggests that much of the
seignorage income of the United States is generated outside of its borders. A natural question
is therefore whether the inﬂation rate that maximizes the utility of the representative do-
mestic consumer is inﬂuenced by the presence of a foreign demand for its country’s currency.
In this paper we address this issue within the context of a dynamic Ramsey problem. We
show that the mere existence of a foreign demand for domestic money can, under plausible
parameterizations, justify sizable deviations from the rate of inﬂation associated with the
Friedman rule. The basic intuition behind this ﬁnding is that adherence to the negative rate
of inﬂation associated with the Friedman rule would represent a welfare-decreasing transfer
of real resources by the domestic economy to the rest of the world, as nominal money bal-
ances held abroad increase in real terms at the rate of deﬂation. A benevolent government
weighs this cost against the beneﬁt of keeping the opportunity cost of holding money low to
reduce transactions costs for domestic agents. Our analytical results show that this tradeoﬀ
is resolved in favor of deviating from the Friedman rule. Indeed, our quantitative analysis
suggests that for plausible calibrations that capture the range of estimates of the size of the
foreign demand for U.S. currency the Ramsey-optimal rate of inﬂation lies between 2 and
10 percent per annum.
The reason why the Ramsey government ﬁnds it optimal to collect seignorage revenues
from the rest of the world is not the fact that such revenues allow the ﬁscal authority to lower
distortionary taxes. Rather, it is the fact that the imposition of an inﬂation tax allows the
domestic government to engineer an indirect transfer of real resources from foreign consumers
to domestic consumers. We highlight this incentive by establishing that in the presence of
a foreign demand for domestic currency the Friedman rule is suboptimal even when the
domestic government has access to lump-sum taxation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a dynamic monetary
model with a foreign demand for domestic currency. Section 3 establishes that the Friedman
rule is optimal in the absence of a foreign demand for domestic currency and that it fails to
1be optimal in the presence of such demand. Section 4 provides estimates of the optimal rate
of inﬂation in the context of a calibrated version of the model. Section 5 demonstrates that
the optimality of inﬂation when the domestic currency is held abroad obtains even when the
domestic government has access to lump-sum taxation. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider an economy populated by a large number of identical households. Each household






where ct denotes consumption, ht denotes labor eﬀort, and β ∈ (0,1) denotes the subjec-
tive discount factor. The single period utility function U is assumed to be increasing in
consumption, decreasing in eﬀort, and strictly concave.
A domestic demand for real balances is introduced into the model by assuming that
nominal money holdings, denoted Md
t , facilitate consumption purchases. Speciﬁcally, con-
sumption purchases are subject to a proportional transaction cost s(vt) that is decreasing in






where Pt denotes the nominal price of the consumption good in period t. The transaction
cost function, s(v), satisﬁes the following assumptions: (a) s(v) is nonnegative and twice
continuously diﬀerentiable; (b) There exists a level of velocity v > 0, to which we refer as
the satiation level of money, such that s(v)=s0(v) = 0; (c) (v − v)s0(v) > 0 for v 6= v;
and (d) 2s0(v)+vs00(v) > 0 for all v ≥ v. Assumption (b) ensures that the Friedman rule,
i.e., a zero nominal interest rate, need not be associated with an inﬁnite demand for money.
It also implies that both the transaction cost and the distortion it introduces vanish when
the nominal interest rate is zero. Assumption (c) guarantees that in equilibrium money
velocity is always greater than or equal to the satiation level. Assumption (d) ensures that
the demand for money is a decreasing function of the nominal interest rate.
Households are assumed have access to one-period nominal bonds, denoted Bt, which
carry a gross nominal interest rate of Rt when held from period t to period t+1. Households
supply labor services to competitive labor markets at the real wage rate wt. In addition,
households receive proﬁt income in the amount Πt from the ownership of ﬁrms, and pay
2income taxes at the ﬂat rate τt. The ﬂow budget constraint of the household in period t is
then given by:
Ptct[1 + s(vt)] + M
d
t + Bt = M
d
t−1 + Rt−1Bt−1 + Pt(1 − τt)(wtht +Π t). (3)
In addition, it is assumed that the household is subject to the following borrowing limit that








This restriction states that in the long run household’s net nominal liabilities must grow at
a rate smaller than the nominal interest rate. It rules out, for example, schemes in which
households roll over their net debts forever.
The household chooses sequences {ct,h t,v t,Md
t ,B t}∞
t=0 to maximize (1) subject to (2)-(4),
taking as given the sequences {Pt,τ t,R t,w t,Πt}∞
t=0 and the initial condition Md
−1 +R−1B−1.
The ﬁrst-order conditions associated with the household’s maximization problem are (2),























Optimality condition (5) can be interpreted as a domestic demand for money or a domestic
liquidity preference function. Given our maintained assumptions about the transactions
technology s(vt), the implied domestic money demand function is decreasing in the gross
nominal interest rate Rt. Further, our assumptions imply that as the interest rate vanishes,
or Rt approaches unity, the domestic demand for money reaches a ﬁnite maximum level
given by ct/v. At this level of money demand, households are able to perform transactions
costlessly, as the transactions cost, s(vt), becomes nil. Optimality condition (6) shows that
a level of money velocity above the satiation level v, or, equivalently, an interest rate greater
than zero, introduces a wedge, given by 1 + s(vt)+vts0(vt), between the marginal rate
of substitution of consumption for leisure and the real wage rate. In addition, the labor
supply distortion has a tax component given by 1 − τt, making the total wedge between
the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for consumption ad the real wage rate equal
3to (1 − τt)/[1 + s(vt)+vts0(vt)]. This wedge induces households to move to an ineﬃcient
allocation featuring too much leisure and too little consumption. The wedge is increasing in
the nominal interest rate and in the income tax rate, implying that the larger is the nominal
interest rate or the income tax rate, the more distorted is the consumption-leisure choice.
Optimality condition (7) is a Fisher equation stating that the nominal interest rate must be
equal to the sum of the expected rate of inﬂation and the real rate of interest. It is clear
from the Fisher equation that intertemporal movements in the nominal interest rate create
a distortion in the real interest rate perceived by households.
Final goods are produced by competitive ﬁrms using the technology F(ht) that takes
labor as the only factor input. The production function F is assumed to be increasing and
concave. Firms choose labor input to maximize proﬁts, which are given by
Πt = F(ht) − wtht.
The ﬁrst-order condition associated with the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem gives rise
to the following demand for labor
F
0(ht)=wt. (8)
The rest of the world demands domestic nominal money balances in the amount M
f
t .W e
assume that the demand by foreigners for real domestic currency is a function of the level of
foreign aggregate activity, denoted y
f
























The transactions cost technology ˜ s satisﬁes the same properties as the domestic transactions
cost function s.
The government prints money, issues nominal, one-period bonds, and levies taxes to
ﬁnance an exogenous stream of public consumption, denoted gt and interest obligations on










t−1 + Rt−1Bt−1 + Ptgt − PtτtF(ht). (11)
Implicit in the sequential budget constraint of the government is the assumption that the
government’s consumption transactions are not subject to a monetary friction like the one
4imposed on private purchases of goods.
Combining the household’s and the government’s sequential budget constraints yields the
following aggregate resource constraint








It is clear from this resource constraint that the domestic economy collects seignorage revenue
from foreigners whenever nominal money balances held by foreigners increase.
A competitive equilibrium is a set of sequences {vt, wt, v
f
t , ct, ht, Md
t , M
f
t , Bt, Pt}∞
t=0
satisfying (2), (4) holding with equality, (5)-(12), and
Rt ≥ 1, (13)
given policies {Rt,τ t}∞
t=0, the exogenous sequences {gt,y
f
t }∞
t=0, and the initial conditions
Md
−1 + R−1B−1 > 0 and M
f
−1. Equilibrium condition (13) imposes a zero lower bound on
the nominal interest rate. Such a bound is required to prevent the possibility of unbounded
arbitrage proﬁts created by taking short positions in nominal bonds and long positions in
nominal ﬁat money, which would result in ill-deﬁned demands for consumption goods by
households.
Our primary goal is to characterize the Ramsey optimal rate of inﬂation. To this end,
we begin by deriving the primal form of the competitive equilibrium. Then we state the
Ramsey problem. And ﬁnally we characterize optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy.
2.1 The Primal Form of the Competitive Equilibrium
Following a long-standing tradition in Public Finance, we study optimal policy using the
primal-form representation of the competitive equilibrium. Finding the primal form involves
the elimination of all prices and tax rates from the equilibrium conditions, so that the re-
sulting reduced form involves only real variables. In our economy, the real variables that
appear in the primal form are consumption, hours, and domestic and foreign money veloc-
ity. The primal form of the equilibrium conditions consists of two equations. One equation
is a feasibility constraint, given by the resource constraint (12), which must hold at every
date. The other equation is a single, present-value constraint known as the implementability
constraint. The implementability constraint guarantees that at the prices and quantities
associated with every possible competitive equilibrium, the present discounted value of con-
solidated government surpluses equals the government’s total initial liabilities.
Formally, given the initial conditions (R−1B−1+Md
−1) and M
f
−1 and the initial price level
5P0, sequences {ct,h t,v t}∞
t=0 satisfy the feasibility condition
















































if and only if they also satisfy the set of equilibrium conditions (2), (4) holding with equality,
and (5)-(13). The function
v
f
t = χ(vt) (17)
is deﬁned as the solution for vf of the implicit function v2s0(v) − (vf)2˜ s0(vf) = 0. Appendix
7.1 presents the proof of this statement.
3 The Ramsey Equilibrium
The government is assumed to be benevolent towards domestic residents. This means that
the welfare function of the government coincides with the lifetime utility of the domestic
representative agent, and that it is independent of the level of utility of foreign residents.
The Ramsey problem consists in choosing a set of strictly positive sequences {ct,h t,v t}∞
t=0 to
maximize the utility function (1) subject to (14), (15), (16), vt ≥ v, and v2
ts0(vt) < 1, given
R−1B−1 + M−1, M
f
−1, and P0. We ﬁx the initial price level arbitrarily to keep the Ramsey
planner from engineering a large unexpected initial inﬂation aimed at reducing the real value
of predetermined nominal government liabilities. This assumption is regularly maintained
in the literature on optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy.
Write the feasibility constraint (15) as H(ct,c t−1,h t,h t−1,v t,v t−1) = 0 and the imple-
mentability constraint (16) as
P∞
t=0 βtK(ct,h t)=A(c0,h 0,v 0). Let the Lagrange multiplier
on the feasibility constraint (15) be denoted by ψt, the Lagrange multiplier on the imple-
6mentability constraint (16) be denoted by λ, and the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint
vt ≥ v be denoted by µt. Then, for any t>0, the ﬁrst-order conditions of the Ramsey
problem are
Uc(ct,h t)+λKc(ct,h t)+ψtH1(ct,c t−1,h t,h t−1,v t,v t−1)+βψt+1H2(ct+1,c t,h t+1,h t,v t+1,v t)=0
(18)
Uh(ct,h t)+λKh(ct,h t)+ψtH3(ct,c t−1,h t,h t−1,v t,v t−1)+βψt+1H4(ct+1,c t,h t+1,h t,v t+1,v t)=0
(19)
ψtH5(ct,c t−1,h t,h t−1,v t,v t−1)+βψt+1H6(ct+1,c t,h t+1,h t,v t+1,v t)+µt =0 , (20)
(vt − v)µt =0 ; µt ≥ 0; vt ≥ v. (21)
We do not include the constraint v2
ts0(vt) < 1 in the Lagrangian. Therefore, we must check
that the solution to the above system satisﬁes this constraint.
When the foreign demand for domestic currency is nil, M
f
t = 0, any policy other than
the Friedman rule fails to be Ramsey optimal. To see this, note that when M
f
t = 0 (or,
equivalently, when yf/χ(vt) = 0), the ﬁrst-order condition of the Ramsey problem with
respect to vt, equation (20), becomes
−ψts
0(vt)ct + µt =0 .
Consider any level of velocity vt greater than v, the level called for by the Friedman rule.
Our assumptions regarding the transactions cost technology imply that s0(v) > 0 for any
vt >v . Also, the fact that the period utility function U is strictly increasing implies that
ψt > 0. It then follows from the above expression that µt is strictly positive when vt >v .
This result and the fact that, by assumption vt >vimply that optimality condition (21)
is violated. We conclude that in the case of no foreign demand for domestic currency, if a
Ramsey equilibrium exists, then it must be characterized by a zero nominal interest rate for
all t>0. This is a standard result in the theory of optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy.
3.1 Failure of the Friedman Rule
We now present the main result of this paper, namely, that the Friedman rule ceases to be
Ramsey optimal in the presence of a foreign demand for domestic currency. To facilitate the
exposition, we restrict attention to the steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium. That is, we
restrict attention to solutions to (15) and (18)-(21) in which the endogenous variables ct, ht,
vt, ψt and µt are constant given constant levels for the exogenous variables gt and y
f
t .T o
establish the failure of the Friedman rule when Mf > 0, we show that a Ramsey equilibrium
7in which vt equals v is impossible. In the steady state, the optimality condition (20) when











+ µ =0 .
Under our maintained assumptions regarding the transactions cost technology, s00(v) is posi-
tive. Also, under reasonable calibrations, the constant 1/β−1, which equals the steady-state
real interest rate, is smaller than the velocity level v. Then, the ﬁrst term in the above ex-
pression is positive. This implies that the multiplier µ must be negative, which violates
optimality condition (21).1
We conclude that in the presence of a foreign demand for domestic currency, if a Ramsey
equilibrium exists, it involves a deviation from the Friedman rule. The intuition behind this
result is that the presence of a foreign demand for domestic currency introduces an incentive
for the ﬁscal authority to inﬂate in order to extract resources, in the form of seignorage, from
the rest of the world (whose welfare does not enter the domestic planner’s objective function).
Indeed, at any negative inﬂation rate (and, most so at the level of inﬂation consistent with
the Friedman rule), the domestic country actually has derives negative seignorage income
from the rest of the world, because foreign money holdings increase in real value as the price
level falls. On the other hand, levying an inﬂation tax on foreign money holdings comes
at the cost of taxing domestic money holdings as well. In turn, the domestic inﬂation tax
entails a welfare loss, because domestic households must pay elevated transaction costs as
they are forced to economize on real balances. Thus, the Ramsey planner faces a tradeoﬀ
between taxing foreign money holdings and distorting the domestic real allocation. We have
demonstrated analytically that the resolution of this tradeoﬀ leads to an inﬂation rate above
the one called for by Friedman’s rule. We now turn to the question of how large the optimal
deviation from the Friedman rule is under a plausible calibration of our model.
4 Quantifying Deviations from the Friedman Rule
To gauge the quantitative implications of a foreign demand for money for the Ramsey-optimal
rate of inﬂation, we parameterize the model and solve numerically for the steady state of the
1One may argue that the assumption 2s0(v)+vs00(v) > 0 for all v ≥ v, which implies that the nominal
interest rate is a strictly increasing function of v for all v ≥ v and, in particular, that the elasticity of the
liquidity preference function at a zero nominal interest rate is ﬁnite, is too restrictive. Suppose instead that
the assumption in question is relaxed by assuming that it must hold only for v>vbut not at v = v.I n
this case, a potential solution to the ﬁrst-order condition of the Ramsey problem with respect to vt is v = v
provided s00(v)=0 .
8Ramsey equilibrium. We adopt the following functional forms for the period utility function,
the transactions cost technology, and the foreign demand for domestic money:
U(c,h)=l n ( c)+θ ln(1 − h); θ>0,





The assumed transactions cost function implies that the satiation level of velocity is v =
p












The assumed form for the function χ implies identical relationships between the nominal
interest rate and domestic-money velocity in the domestic and the foreign economies.
We follow Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004) and set β =1 /1.04, θ =2 .90, B =0 .07524,
and gt =0 .04 for all t, which implies a share of government spending of about 20 percent.
We set yf =0 .06 and A =0 .0056 to match the empirical regularities that about 50 percent
of U.S. currency (or about 26 percent of M1) is held outside of the United States and that
the M1-to-consumption ratio is about 29 percent.2 Finally, we set the level of debt in the
Ramsey steady state to 20 percent of GDP.3
We develop a numerical algorithm that delivers the exact solution to the steady state of
the Ramsey equilibrium. The mechanics of the algorithm are as follows: (1) Pick a positive
value of λ. (2) Given this value of λ solve the nonlinear system (15) and (18)-(21) for c, h,
v, ψ, and µ. (3) Calculate w from (8), τ from (6), R from (5), π from (7), vf from (17),
Md
t /Pt from (2), and M
f
t /Pt from (10). (4) Calculate the steady-state debt-to-output ratio,
which we denote by sd ≡ Bt/(Ptyt), from (11), taking into account that y = h. (5) If sd is
larger than the calibrated value of 0.2, lower λ. If, instead, sd is smaller than the calibrated
2For an estimate of the amount of U.S. currency circulating abroad, see the joint press release of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Department of the Treasury of October 25, 2006,
available online at www.federalreserve.gov.
3This debt level implies that the pre-Ramsey reform debt-to-output ratio in the economy without a foreign
demand for domestic currency and with a pre-reform inﬂation rate of 4.2 percent is about 44 percent. The
reason why the Ramsey steady-state level of debt is much lower than the pre-Ramsey-reform level is that
the reform induces a drop in expected inﬂation of about 8 percent, which causes a large asset substitution
away from government bonds and toward real money balances. The overall level of government liabilities
(money plus bonds) is relatively unaﬀected by the Ramsey reform.





No Foreign Demand: yf = 0 0.00 0.27 -3.85 0.00 17.56
Baseline Calibration: yf =0 .06 0.22 0.26 2.10 6.18 16.15
Higher Foreign Demand: yf =0 .1 0.32 0.24 10.52 14.94 14.64
Low Domestic Demand: A =0 .0014 0.22 0.13 2.11 6.19 16.33
High Interest Elasticity: B =0 .0376 0.22 0.37 -0.96 3.00 16.95
High Debt-to-Output Ratio: B
Py =0 .50 0.22 0.26 2.21 6.30 17.50
Lump-Sum Taxes 0.20 0.27 0.85 4.88 0.00
Lump-Sum Taxes and gt = 0 0.19 0.27 0.59 4.62 —
Note: The baseline calibration is: A=0.0056, B=0.07524, B
Py =0 .2, yf =0 .06.
The interest rate, R, and the inﬂation rate, π, are expressed in percent per
annum, and the income tax rate, τ, is expressed in percent.
value of 0.2, then increase the value of λ. (6) Repeat steps (1)-(5) until sd has converged to
its calibrated value.
Table 1 presents our numerical results. The ﬁrst line of the table shows that when foreign
demand for domestic currency is nil, which we capture by setting yf = 0, then as we have
shown analytically above the Friedman rule is Ramsey optimal, that is, the nominal interest
rate is zero in the steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium. The inﬂation rate is -3.85 percent
and the income tax rate is about 18 percent. In this case, because the foreign demand for
domestic currency is nil, the domestic government has no incentives to levy an inﬂation tax,
as it would generate no revenues from the rest of the world. The second row of the table
considers the case that the foreign demand for domestic currency is positive. In particular,
we set yf =0 .06 and obtain that in the Ramsey steady state the ratio of foreign currency
to total money is 22 percent and that total money holdings are 26 percent of consumption.
Both ﬁgures are broadly in line with observation in the U.S. economy. The table shows, again
in line with the analytical results obtained above, that the Ramsey optimal rate of interest
is positive, that is, the Friedman rule is no longer optimal. Of greater interest however is
the size of the deviation from the Friedman rule. The table shows that the Ramsey optimal
inﬂation rate is 2.10 percent per year about 6 percentage points higher than the value that
obtains in the absence of a foreign demand for domestic currency. The optimal rate of
interest now is 6.2 percent. When we increase foreign demand for domestic currency by
assuming a larger value of foreign demand, yf =0 .1, then the share of foreign holdings of
domestic currency in total money increases by 10 percentage points to 0.32 and the Ramsey
optimal inﬂation rate is more than 10 percent per year. In this calibration, the beneﬁt from
10collecting an inﬂation tax from foreign holdings of currency appears to strongly dominate
the costs that such a high inﬂation tax represents for domestic agents in terms of a of a more
distorted consumption-leisure choice and elevated transaction costs. The larger inﬂation tax
revenue of the government relaxes the budget constraint of the government allowing for a
decline in the Ramsey optimal tax rate of about 1.5 percentage points.
Line 4 of table 1 considers a calibration that implies a weaker demand for money both
domestically and abroad. Speciﬁcally, we lower the coeﬃcient A in the transactions cost
function by a factor of 4. Because the demand for money is proportional to the square root
of A, this parameter change implies that the ratio of money to consumption falls by a factor
of two. In the Ramsey steady state, the money-to-consumption ratio falls from 26 to 13
percent. The relative importance of foreign demand for money is unchanged. It continues to
account for 22 percent of total money demand. The optimal rate of inﬂation is virtually the
same as in the baseline case. The reason why the inﬂation tax is virtually unchanged in this
case is that the reduction in A induces proportional declines in both the domestic and the
foreign demands for domestic currency. The decline in foreign money demand is equivalent
to a decline in yf, and therefore induces the Ramsey planner to lower the rate of inﬂation.
At the same time, the decline in the domestic demand for money reduces the cost of inﬂation
for domestic agents, inducing the Ramsey planner to inﬂate more. In our parameterization,
these two opposing eﬀects happen to oﬀset each other almost exactly.
Line 5 of table 1 analyzes the sensitivity of our results to raising the interest elasticity
of money demand. Under a higher interest elasticity the Ramsey optimal rate of interest
and inﬂation are lower than in the baseline case. The nominal interest rate falls from 6 to
3 percent and the inﬂation rate falls from about 2 percent to negative 1 percent. In this
case while the Ramsey policy deviates from the Friedman rule, the deviation is not large
enough to render positive inﬂation Ramsey optimal. The last line of the table shows that
our results are very little changed when we increase the steady state debt level. We conclude
from the results presented in table 1 that the tradeoﬀ between collecting seignorage from
foreign holders of domestic currency and keeping the opportunity cost of holding money low
for domestic agents is overwhelmingly resolved in favor of collecting seignorage income from
foreign holdings of domestic currency.
The numerical results of this section suggest that an inﬂation target of about 2 percent
per annum may be rationalized on the basis of an incentive to tax foreign holdings of domestic
currency. This argument could in principle be raised to explain average rates of inﬂation in
countries such as the United States, which we used as a point of reference in our calibration,
or in the Euro area, whose currency is held widely in eastern Europe, Russia, and certain
parts of the Asia minor. However, the fact that a number of developed countries whose
11currency is not use outside of their geographic borders, such as Australia, Canada, and New
Zealand, also maintain inﬂation targets of about two percent per year, indicates that the
reason why inﬂation targets in the developed world are as high as observed may not originate
from the desire to extract seignorage revenue from foreigners.
5 Lump-Sum Taxation
The reason why the benevolent government ﬁnds it desirable to deviate from the Friedman
rule in the presence of a foreign demand for currency is not entirely to ﬁnance its budget
with seignorage revenue extracted from foreign residents. Rather, the government imposes
an inﬂation tax on foreign residents to increase the total amount of resources available to
domestic residents for consumption. To show that this is indeed the correct interpretation
of our results, we now consider a variation of the model in which the government can levy
lump-sum taxes on domestic residents. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the labor income tax
rate τt is zero at all times, and that the government sets lump-sum taxes to ensure ﬁscal
solvency.
A competitive equilibrium is then given by sequences {vt, v
f













given an interest rate sequence {Rt}∞




One can show that, given the initial condition M
f
−1 and the initial price level P0, sequences
{ct,h t,v t}∞
t=0 satisfy the feasibility conditions (14) and (15), the labor supply equation (22),
and




if and only if they also satisfy the set of equilibrium conditions (2), (5), (7), (9), (10),
(12), (13), and (22). This primal form is essentially the same as the one associated with the
economy with distortionary taxes and government spending except that the implementability
constraint is replaced by equation (22), which states that in equilibrium labor demand must
equal labor supply. Noting that equation (22) appears in both the standard and the primal
forms of the competitive equilibrium, it follows that the proof of the above statement is a
simpliﬁed version of the one presented in the appendix. The Ramsey problem then consists
in maximizing the utility function (1) subject to the feasibility constraints (14) and (15) and
the restrictions vt ≥ v and v2
ts0(vt) < 1, given P0 and M
f
−1.
12Line 7 of table 1 presents the steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium in the economy
with lump-sum taxes. All parameters of the model are calibrated as in the economy with
distortionary taxes. The table shows that the optimal rate of inﬂation equals 0.85 percent.
This means that the presence of a foreign demand for money gives rise to an optimal inﬂation
bias of about 5 percentage points above the level of inﬂation called for by the Friedman rule.
This inﬂation bias emerges even though the government can resort to lump-sum taxes to
ﬁnance its budget. The optimal inﬂation bias is smaller than in the case with distortionary
taxes. This is because distortionary taxes, through their depressing eﬀect on employment
and output, make the pre-foreign-seignorage level of consumption lower, raising the marginal
utility of wealth, and as a result providing bigger incentives for the extraction of real resources
from the rest of the world.
The last row of table 1 displays the steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium in the case
in which government consumption equals zero at all times (gt = 0 for all t). All other things
equal, the domestic economy has access to a larger amount of resources than in the economy
with positive government consumption. As a result, the government has less incentives to
collect seignorage income from the rest of the world. This is reﬂected in a smaller optimal
rate of inﬂation of 0.59 percent. It is remarkable, however, that even in the absence of
distortionary taxes and government expenditures, the government ﬁnds it optimal to deviate
from the Friedman rule by about 4.5 percentage points. This result clearly shows that the
ultimate purpose of positive interest rates in the presence of a foreign demand for money is
the extraction of real resources from the rest of the world for private domestic consumption.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have demonstrated that the presence of a foreign demand for domestic
currency of the size observed for the U.S. dollar can introduce incentives for the monetary
authority to generate positive rates of inﬂation. The inﬂation rate acts as a tax on foreign
holdings of domestic currency that allows the domestic government to eﬀectively extract
real resources from the rest of the world. In our model, the Ramsey planner weights this
incentive against the cost that inﬂation causes to domestic households. In the absence of a
foreign demand for money, the Ramsey-optimal policy calls for adopting Friedman’s rule, or
deﬂating at the real rate of interest. We ﬁnd that for plausible calibrations of our model, the
tradeoﬀ between taxing the rest of the world and keeping domestic transactions costs low is
resolved in favor of taxing foreign holdings of domestic currency at rates ranging from 2 to
10 percent per year.
137 Appendix
7.1 Derivation of the Primal Form
We ﬁrst show that plans {ct,h t,v t} satisfying the equilibrium conditions (2), (4) holding
with equality, and (5)-(13) also satisfy (15), (16), vt ≥ v, and v2
ts0(vt) < 1. Let γ(vt) ≡
1+s(vt)+vts0(vt). Note that (5), (13), and our maintained assumptions regarding s(v)
together imply that vt ≥ v and v2
ts0(vt) < 1.
Let Wt+1 = RtBt+Md
t +M
f









t )(1 − R
−1
t )+qt+1Wt+1 − qtWt = qt[Ptgt − τtPtF(ht)].








t )(1 − R
−1
t ) − qt(Ptgt − τtPtF(ht))
i
= −qT+1WT+1 + W0.
In writing this expression, we deﬁne q0 = 1. Solve (6) for τt and (8) for wt and use F(h)=h
to obtain τtF(ht)=ht +
Uh(ct,ht)
Uc(ct,ht)γ(vt)ht. Use this expression to eliminate τtF(ht) from the
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Use (2) and (5) to replace
Md
t
Pt (1 − R
−1
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TqT+1 = −qT+1WT+1 + W0.
















+ R−1B−1 + M
d
−1. (23)
Take limits for T →∞ . Then by (4) holding with equality the limit of the right hand side is
well deﬁned and equal to R−1B−1 + Md











= R−1B−1 + M
d
−1.
By (7) we have that Ptqt = βtUc(ct,h t)/γ(vt)P0/Uc(c0,h 0)γ(v0). Use this expression to















We next show that the competitive equilibrium conditions imply (15). For t = 0 equation






















Now use (7) to eliminate πt. This yields:















Using (5) to replace Rt−1 yields (15). This completes the proof that the competitive equi-
librium conditions imply the primal form conditions.
We now show that plans {ct,h t,v t} satisfying (15), (16), vt ≥ v, and v2
ts0(vt) < 1 also
satisfy the equilibrium conditions (2), (4) holding with equality, and (5)-(13). Given a plan
{ct,h t,v t} proceed as follows. Use (5) to construct Rt and (9) to construct v
f
t . Note that
under the maintained assumptions on s(v), the constraints vt ≥ v and v2
ts0(vt) < 1 ensure
that Rt ≥ 1. Let wt be given by (8) and τt by (6).
To construct plans for Md
t , M
f
t , Pt+1, and Bt, for t ≥ 0, use the following iterative
procedure: (a) Set t = 0; (b) Use equation (2) to construct Md
t and equation (10) to
construct M
f
t (recall that P0 is given); (c) Set Bt so as to satisfy equation (11); (d) Set Pt+1
to satisfy (7); (e) Increase t by 1 and repeat steps (b) to (e). To show that (12) holds use
(15). Combining (10) and (17) with (14) it is obvious that (12) holds for t = 0. To show
that it also holds for t>0, combine (10), (17), and (15) to obtain:




















Using (5) one can write this expression as:
















Finally, combining this expression with (7) yields (12).
It remains to be shown that (4) holds with equality. Follow the steps shown above to
arrive at equation (23). Notice that these steps make use only of equilibrium conditions that
we have already shown are implied by the primal form. Now use (7) to replace Ptqt with





















Taking limit for T →∞ , recalling the deﬁnition of qt, and using (16) yields (4) holding with
equality. This completes the proof.
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